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Broadly speaking, in The Netherlands all individuals aged 65 or over
are entitled to the same Basic State Pension (Social Security—AOW in
Dutch—abbreviated to SS throughout this chapter). Most other public
beneﬁts (e.g., disability insurance [DI], unemployment insurance [UI], wel-
fare) expire when one turns 65. In addition, for those both above and below
65, next to the public entitlement programs guaranteed by law, a relatively
large percentage of people who stop working are entitled to other private
beneﬁts, for example, occupational pensions supplementing SS for individ-
uals over 65 and early-retirement (ER) beneﬁts for individuals below 65.
Like most other developed countries, The Netherlands is faced with an
increasing share of elderly in its total population. The share of the popula-
tion over 65 has grown from 8 percent in 1950 to 14 percent in 2000 and
is expected to rise to 24 percent by the year 2035. If nothing else changes,
this will cause a considerable increase in SS expenditures. Faced with this
prospect, the government has recently come up with policy measures to
maintain its sustainability. Furthermore, recent developments in the stock
market have caused concern about the sustainability of the fully funded oc-
cupational pensions supplementing SS, most of which are characterized by
deﬁned beneﬁts.
An additional problem for the Dutch economy is the low labor force par-
ticipation rate of individuals below 65 combined with the costs of the pro-
grams providing income to the individuals in this age group who have left
the labor force. This concerns public programs, such as DI, but also private
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CentERdata, Tilburg University.ER schemes. During the 1980s and 1990s these programs have induced al-
most all employees to retire before reaching the age of 65. All of this has led
to highly increased costs, both for the public DI and UI programs and for
the employer-ﬁnanced ER schemes. In reaction, eligibility conditions for
DI and UI beneﬁts have been tightened, and, increasingly, ER schemes are
replaced by ﬂexible retirement programs oﬀering less attractive and actu-
arially fair (or fairer) pensions. In addition, the earlier pressure on elderly
employees to vacate one’s job for a younger job seeker has decreased dra-
matically with the spectacular reduction in unemployment. It remains to
be seen to what extent all these phenomena will actually contribute to a re-
versal of the trend of decreasing labor market participation of the elderly.
In this chapter, we use model speciﬁcations developed in our earlier
work (de Vos and Kapteyn 2004) to simulate the eﬀect of three policy re-
forms on retirement patterns and on the beneﬁts and taxes individuals pay
after the age of 50. Notably, these reforms have been chosen for the purpose
of cross-country comparisons, and are not being proposed as desirable or
politically feasible reforms in The Netherlands. The remainder of the chap-
ter is structured as follows. In section 8.2 we sketch the institutional frame-
work within which people retire in The Netherlands. Section 8.3 describes
the data and the way in which we use them for our analysis. Section 8.4 is
devoted to the construction of incentive measures that are used in the esti-
mation of the retirement equations. These equations are speciﬁed accord-
ing to a common model, which is by and large used for all countries repre-
sented in this study. Section 8.5 presents the estimation results for the
common model. Section 8.6 describes the three reforms, section 8.7 gives
results of the policy simulations based on the estimated common model,
and section 8.8 concludes.
8.2 Institutional Background
Social security (SS) guarantees a suﬃcient income to virtually all indi-
viduals 65 or over. Basically, SS is a ﬂat-rate beneﬁt equal to half the statu-
tory minimum wage (after tax) with supplements for single individuals and
for individuals with a spouse aged younger than 65 with a low income. So-
cial security is ﬁnanced largely as pay-as-you-go by a payroll tax on taxable
income of individuals aged below 65. The associated tax rate is currently
17.9 percent (as of 2003), levied on taxable income up to a maximum (of
€28,850 per annum). In 2001, SS beneﬁts amounted to more than €20 bil-
lion, or 5 percent of GDP. Currently, about one in every ﬁve households in
The Netherlands receives SS. The entitlement to SS does not require re-
tirement from the labor force.
8.2.1 Other Public Programs
A number of arrangements exist that enable individuals to stop working
before turning 65. The main ones are: DI, UI, and various ER schemes.
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to long-term sickness and disability. Currently, DI guarantees employees
who lost more than 80 percent of their earnings capacity a beneﬁt equal to
70 percent (80 percent before 1985) of their daily wage (up to a maximum).
The beneﬁt falls to a lower level after a certain period (both the length of
this period and the percentage depend on age), and terminates at age 65.
Most employees have taken out an additional insurance to cover the risk
of a DI beneﬁt falling below 70 percent of their previous earnings.1
In the 1980s, the DI program became a very popular arrangement,
which employers could use to shed less productive elderly employees. Se-
vere legal obstacles existed (and still exist) to lay oﬀ employees, while DI
beneﬁts were more generous than UI beneﬁts. As a result, both employers
and employees had a preference for the disability route to unemployment.
The ensuing rise in costs of DI has induced the government to limit eligi-
bility for it by tightening entry conditions and reducing beneﬁt levels.
Moreover, individuals receiving disability beneﬁts are now subject to a
more rigorous screening of their loss of earnings capacity.
The main reason why UI is less attractive than DI is that unemployment
beneﬁts are only paid for a limited period (depending on the number of
years worked before unemployment). However, most people aged 60 or
above who become unemployed can expect to receive unemployment bene-
ﬁts equal to 70 percent of their previous earnings up to age 65.2
All public beneﬁts for individuals younger than 65 are paid only if an in-
dividual is not employed.3
8.2.2 Private Transfers
Next to SS, a majority of the population over 65 is entitled to a supple-
mentary occupational pension. In general, if an employer oﬀers a pension
scheme, then participation in such a scheme is compulsory. Until recently,
more than 99 percent of the pension schemes were of the deﬁned-beneﬁt
type, most of them being deﬁned on the basis of ﬁnal pay. Typically, occu-
pational pensions—(PP [private pensions])—supplement SS to 70 percent
of ﬁnal pay for individuals who have worked 40 years. After tax, the re-
placement rate is usually substantially higher.
Most large ﬁrms have their own pension fund; smaller ﬁrms usually par-
ticipate in sector-wide pension funds. Usually, these private pension
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1. It should be noted that for single earners who lost more than 80 percent of their earnings
capacity, disability beneﬁts are always at least as high as the relevant social assistance (wel-
fare) level (ABW/RWW), which, for a couple, is approximately equal to the after-tax mini-
mum wage. In contrast to the entitlement to social assistance, household wealth is not taken
into account when determining eligibility.
2. Similar to the case for disability beneﬁts, if necessary the unemployment beneﬁt is sup-
plemented by welfare beneﬁts to reach the social assistance level without taking household
wealth into account. Hence, for single earners with low wages, the replacement rate can be al-
most 100 percent.
3. For individuals in part-time employment, beneﬁts may supplement their earnings.arrangements require that people leave the job in which they accumulate
pension rights at age 65 at the latest. There is no earnings test, however, and
people may consider looking for secondary jobs once they retire.
Early retirement (ER) has become increasingly common during the
1980s, and was viewed as a means of reducing unemployment. Typically,
the ER schemes guarantee an employee a beneﬁt equal to 70 or 80 percent
of previous earnings up to the age of 65. In after-tax terms, replacement
rates are even higher. Furthermore, while being in ER, one often keeps ac-
cumulating pension rights, though possibly at a lower rate than when one
would be working.
Early retirement may be organized via the pension funds, which also
provide the occupational pensions, or via the employer. Moreover, in con-
trast to pensions, ER is mostly ﬁnanced as pay-as-you-go. Early retirement
usually requires ten years of employment with the same employer before
the ER date, whereas old-age pension rights remain valid if the worker
changes jobs. The receipt of ER pensions usually requires a complete with-
drawal from the labor market.
In recent years, costs of ER have increased considerably, and many ﬁrms
are currently trying to reduce these costs. In particular, as mentioned in the
introduction, instead of the original arrangements, which provided incen-
tives to retire as soon as one was eligible, more and more programs are be-
ing introduced that oﬀer ﬂexible ER pensions, of which the level depends
on the retirement age.
Despite these developments, the general conclusion remains that an
elaborate system of income-replacing transfers exists in The Netherlands,
which can be expected to act as incentives to leave the labor force on one’s
65th birthday at the latest. Moreover, it should be noted that whereas
rather strict laws are in force that prevent employers from laying oﬀ
younger employees, reaching age 65 is a legal reason for dismissal, and so-
cial insurance protecting against loss of earnings as a result of sickness, dis-
ability, or unemployment only cover employees younger than 65.
8.3 The Data
Most of the results presented in this chapter are obtained using The
Netherlands Socio-Economic Panel (SEP). The SEP is a longitudinal sur-
vey administered by Statistics Netherlands (CBS), consisting of approxi-
mately 5,000 households. The survey is representative of the Dutch popu-
lation, excluding those living in special institutions like nursing homes. The
SEP was launched in April 1984. The same households were interviewed in
October 1984 and then twice a year (in April and October) until 1989.
Since 1990, the survey has been conducted once a year (in May). In order
to address the problem of sample attrition, Statistics Netherlands regularly
adds new households to the SEP. Information is collected at the respondent
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pation, and on a wide range of assets and liabilities at the household level.
For this paper, data have been used for the period 1984 to 1996.
In the analysis, we include men and unmarried women aged 50 to 64 who
had positive earnings in 1984. Individuals are added in later years (until
1994) as they turn 50, subject to positive earnings at age 50. For all indi-
viduals, we observe whether they retire during the next year, and if so,
whether they receive (early) retirement pensions, disability or unemploy-
ment insurance beneﬁts, or no beneﬁts at all. In addition, we observe edu-
cation level, labor market sector, number of hours worked, and so on. For
the purpose of this analysis we restrict the sample to working males (with
or without partner) and working females without a partner. Individuals
are in our sample for all the years they are working plus the ﬁrst year they
enter retirement. Retirement is assumed to be absorbing, so after an indi-
vidual enters retirement, he or she is no longer followed. All information
available for the individual is also available for his or her partner. In addi-
tion, we have information on assets and income from capital received by
the household. However, this information is fairly unreliable and is not
used in our analyses. Table 8.1 presents the means of the most important
variables used in estimation. The meaning of option value (OV) and peak
value (PV) is explained in the following. Social security wealth (SSW) com-
prises the present value of both SS and other beneﬁts one receives in re-
tirement.
As we are trying to model the individual retirement decision, we are lim-
ited by a lack of information on the eligibility for the various exit routes out
of the labor force. In particular, we don’t know whether and at which age
individuals can take ER. We also don’t know whether they might be en-
titled to DI beneﬁts—and we have insuﬃcient health information to be
used as a proxy (although health would not present the full picture of DI
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Table 8.1 Sample statistics of the variables used in estimation
Variable Mean Standard deviation
Retired (%) 11.8
Social security wealth 218,021 98,635
Option value 12,201 6,849
Peak value 35,228 26,488
After-tax earnings 20,724 10,499
After-tax earnings partner 2,704 9,078
Age 54.5 3.5
Two-earner family (%) 28.1
Partner present (%) 82.7
Female head (%) 10.9
Note: Number of observations   3,922; money amounts in 2001 euros.eligibility anyway). Therefore, the incentives for the individual to retire
have been approximated as a weighted average of the incentives provided
by the various exit routes, where the weight for a particular exit route is de-
termined by the proportion of individuals in the age group observed to ul-
timately retire taking the exit route in question. The incentive to retire
through ER is calculated as a weighted average of the incentive to retire
through ER, given eligibility at a certain age. For this eligibility age for ER
we have used information based on one wave of an alternative panel, the
CentERpanel,4 in which employed individuals were asked whether they
were participating in an occupational pension plan, and at which age that
would allow them to retire. The eligibility age distribution for ER is diﬀer-
entiated by sector of employment (see de Vos and Kapteyn 2004, table 5).
8.4 Construction of Incentive Measures
As SS is a ﬂat-rate beneﬁt, whereas ER, DI, and UI beneﬁts and occu-
pational pensions are (usually) based on ﬁnal pay, information on earnings
histories is not needed to determine social security wealth (the actuarially
discounted sum of future beneﬁts; the beneﬁts include not only SS beneﬁts
but also ER, PP, DI, and UI beneﬁts wherever appropriate). Only infor-
mation on the number of years in pensionable employment, together with
information on the ﬁnal earnings, would be suﬃcient to determine the ben-
eﬁt level to which the individual is entitled. The number of years in pen-
sionable employment is generally unknown, but in the Dutch system this
number, although clearly aﬀecting SSW, generally has only a marginal
eﬀect on most of the incentive variables to be included in the retirement de-
cision (peak value and option value, deﬁned later): the eﬀect of working an
additional year is by and large constant over a rather wide interval of years.
As the jump-oﬀpoint for the forward projections we use actual earnings,
assuming constant real earnings. We do not calculate three-year averages,
because this would limit the number of observations that could be included
in the analysis.
In our calculations we do not distinguish UI beneﬁts from DI beneﬁts
(both are received until the age of 65), and assume that, like SS (received
after age 65), beneﬁts do not depend on the age of retirement. After be-
coming unemployed or disabled, the older worker can expect to keep the
same level of beneﬁts up to age 65. After age 65, SS is independent of work
history. Hence, the only way in which an employee’s future income (after
the coming year) may be aﬀected by retiring one year earlier is via his or
her private pension. Retiring before the age of 65 may aﬀect the level of
private pension to be received after age 65 by reducing the number of years
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4. The CentERpanel comprises about 2,000 households and is run by CentERdata, a sur-
vey research institute aﬃliated with Tilburg University.counting toward pension beneﬁts. Moreover, if an employee were to retire
before his or her ER age he or she would no longer be eligible for ER bene-
ﬁts.
In this section we describe how SSW, option values, and peak values are
calculated. As mentioned previously, SSW is calculated as the actuarially
discounted sum of future beneﬁts. In our incentive calculations we distin-
guish the following cases:
1. Eligibility for (early) retirement at a certain age between 55 and 65.
Eligible individuals will receive a private pension in addition to SS once
they turn 65.
2. Eligibility for disability/unemployment beneﬁt upon retirement be-
fore age 65, receipt of a private pension in addition to SS as of age 65.
3. Eligibility for SS only (as of age 65).
For all entitlements, we assume zero growth in real terms after 1995.5For
survival probabilities we use sex- and/or age-speciﬁc survival tables of Sta-
tistics Netherlands (1992). We assume independence between the mortal-
ity rates of the worker and his or her spouse. We use a real discount rate of
3 percent. To compute net beneﬁt and pension levels we subtract payroll
and income taxes. For the years after 1995 we use the tax schedule for 1995,
keeping tax rates and brackets ﬁxed in real terms. For individuals with
working spouses, we assume that the spouse will stop working at age 65. In
our calculations, we take into account that if an individual retires before
age 65 and is not entitled to any beneﬁt or pension, his or her spouse (if
older than 65) may be entitled to a supplement to his or her SS beneﬁt.
The option value of postponing retirement (Stock and Wise 1990) is ap-
proximated as
(1) Gt(r∗)   V t(r∗)   V t(t),
where V t(t) represents the utility of retiring now and V t(r∗) represents the
highest feasible utility (obtained by retiring at age r∗). V t(r) is calculated as
(2) V t(r)  ∑
r 1
s t
 s tY s
   ∑
S
s r
 s t[kBs(r)] ,
where Ys represents earnings in the years before retirement and Bs(r) rep-
resents beneﬁts received in the years after retirement at age r. We use k  
1.5,   0.97, and   0.75.
The peak value, as proposed by Coile and Gruber (2000), is deﬁned as
the diﬀerence between the highest possible SSW when retiring at some
point in the future and SSW when retiring now.
As mentioned earlier, the incentive measures used in the estimations in
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5. For disability, SS, and unemployment beneﬁts, this is more or less in line with current
government policy.the next section are weighted averages of the incentives for the various exit
routes (DI, ER, SS only), where the weights are determined by the propor-
tions of persons ultimately retiring in the various programs, diﬀerentiated
by age. Notably, in these calculations, the fact that persons may become
eligible for ER at diﬀerent ages is taken into account by using the proba-
bilities for eligibility by age based on results of the CentERpanel, as de-
scribed earlier, multiplied by the empirical take-up rate of ER. In this way,
the weighted SSW-measure of individuals aged 60, for example, is calcu-
lated as:
(3) SSW 60   pDI,60SSWDI,60   pexit,60SSW SSonly,60   pER,60(pER,60 60SSW ER,60
  pER,61 60SSW ER,61   pER,62 60SSW ER,62   pER,63 60SSW ER,63
  pER,64 60SSW ER,64   pER,65 60SSW ER,65),
where pER,60, pDI,60 and pexit,60 are empirical proportions of persons ulti-
mately retiring on the various programs, and pER,60 60, . . . , pER,65 60 repre-
sent sector-speciﬁc eligibility probabilities (for ER at age 60 through 65,
given eligibility for private pension and having reached age 60, respec-
tively), based on the CentERpanel data. The same weighting scheme is
used for the calculation of option and peak values. Notably, this weighting
scheme diﬀers from the one used in the previous volume.
8.5 Estimation Results for Two Model Versions
Table 8.2 presents the estimation results of the retirement probits for
four variants. Two variants use peak value as an incentive variable (col-
umns [1] and [3]) and either represent age by means of separate dummies
or a quadratic in age. The two remaining variants are similar, but with peak
value replaced by option value as an incentive variable.
We observe that in columns (1) and (3), peak value is insigniﬁcant. In the
other columns, option value is highly signiﬁcant. Social security wealth
has a signiﬁcant positive inﬂuence on the probability of exit out of the la-
bor force. The presence of a partner, whether one lives in a two-earner fam-
ily, and being female all have a negative eﬀect on the probability of exit, al-
though the coeﬃcients of these variables generally are not signiﬁcant. Age
has a positive eﬀect on the likelihood of labor-force exit. The age dummies
exhibit peaks at ages 59, 60, and 64. Ages 59 or 60 are, in most cases, the
early retirement age. The normal retirement age is 65.
8.6 Description of Reforms
We consider three incentive changes and their eﬀects on retirement
probabilities. The reforms and their implications for retirement are dis-
cussed consecutively.
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Variant 1 Variant 2 Variant 3 Variant 4
Peak value, Option value, Peak value,  Option value,
Variable age dummies age dummies quadratic age quadratic age
Social security wealth 3.76e-07 2.90e-07 2.59e-07 2.87e-07
(2.89)∗∗∗ (2.82)∗∗∗ (2.08)∗∗ (2.77)∗∗∗
Peak value –6.16e-07 2.95e-08
(1.53) (0.08)
Option value –0.0000101 –9.49e-06
(4.66)∗∗ (4.46)∗∗∗
Net income –2.19e-06 2.24e-06 –2.56e-06 2.15e-06
(2.00)∗∗ (1.56) (2.32)∗∗ (1.50)
Net income squared –2.50e-12 –1.73e-11 –1.28e-12 –2.07e-11
(0.20) (1.34) (0.11) (1.59)
Include partner 3.83e-06 4.25e-06 3.96e-06 4.41e-06
(0.90) (1.02) (1.03) (1.08)
Include partner squares –1.30e-10 –1.35e-10 –1.02e-10 –1.25e-10






























Two earners –0.023 –0.021 –0.028 –0.024
(1.08) (1.01) (1.34) (1.15)
(continued)8.6.1 Reform 1. A Three-Year Increment in Eligibility Ages (the Three-
Year Reform)
Since eligibility is not directly observed and the computation of incen-
tives is based on actual retirement behavior, there are diﬀerent ways in
which one can implement such a reform in the context of the model as pre-
sented so far. We choose a particularly straightforward approach by calcu-
lating for every individual in the sample (and his or her partner, if any) the
incentive variables as if this individual were three years younger. That is, we
assign the weights as well as the amounts of beneﬁts to be received (but not
mortality rates) as if the individual is three years younger and then recal-
culate the incentive variables. However, for ages 51 to 53, we assume that
the weights for ER and DI are zero. The working spouse is assumed to re-
tire at the original retirement age of 65. We present two diﬀerent sets of
simulation results. The ﬁrst simulation (S1) simply uses the retirement
equations with age and age-squared and replaces the incentive variables by
the new ones, based on delayed eligibility. Regarding the model with age
dummies, the S3 simulation shifts the age dummies backward by three
years. That is, for ages 51, 52, and 53, the age dummies are set equal to zero.
The new age dummy for age 54 is set equal to the estimated age dummy for
age 51, the new age dummy for age 55 is set equal to the estimated age
dummy for age 52, and so on.
8.6.2 Reform 2. The Common Reform
The Common Reform involves the possibility of early retirement at age
60 and normal retirement at age 65. The replacement rates depend on age.
The (before-tax) replacement rate at age 65 is equal to 60 percent of aver-
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Table 8.2 (continued)
Variant 1 Variant 2 Variant 3 Variant 4
Peak value, Option value, Peak value,  Option value,
Variable age dummies age dummies quadratic age quadratic age
Partner –0.019 –0.009 –0.008 –0.009
(0.92) (0.48) (0.38) (0.47)
Female –0.025 –0.022 –0.020 –0.020





No. of observations 3,922 3,922 3,922 3,922
Note: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at 1 percent.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at 5 percent.age lifetime earnings during the 40 best years (assumed to be 75 percent of
current earnings). At other ages, an actuarial adjustment of 6 percent is ap-
plied.6 That is, when retiring at age 60 an individual receives 70 percent of
the pension receivable upon retirement at age 65, when retiring at age 61
the individual receives 76 percent, and so on. This also applies to retire-
ment ages higher than 65. For instance, when retiring at age 70, an indi-
vidual receives 130 percent. Widows receive the maximum of their own
pension and the pension of the spouse. Again, two sets of simulation re-
sults are presented: S1, using the retirement equation with age and age-
squared and replacing the incentive variables with the ones calculated for
the Common Reform, and S3, using the retirement equation with age dum-
mies, where the same incentive variables are used, and where the dummies
for ages above 64 are assumed to be similar to the age dummy for age 64.
8.6.3 Reform 3. Actuarial Reform
In this reform we stay as close as possible to the current beneﬁt system,
but adjust beneﬁts such that these change with the age of retirement in an
approximately actuarially fair way. In particular, ER and DI beneﬁts are
assumed to depend on the age of retirement. Moreover, recipients of these
beneﬁts keep receiving the same level of beneﬁts upon reaching age 65,
rather than shifting to SS   PP. The (full) ER replacement rate is assumed
to be equal to the PP replacement rate of 70 percent, but recipients of DI
and ER no longer pay SS payroll taxes. In keeping with the current system,
all persons who did not retire earlier are assumed to retire at age 65. As was
the case previously, we present the results of simulations S1 and S3, ob-
tained by replacing the incentive variables by the ones implied by the re-
form.
8.6.4 Simulation Cohort
The ﬁscal eﬀects in terms of costs (pension beneﬁts) and beneﬁts (pay-
roll taxes, occupational pension contributions, income taxes, and VAT) for
the base case and the three pension reforms have been simulated for a co-
hort of age-50 workers, on the basis of the retirement probabilities esti-
mated earlier. In order to increase the number of observations, this cohort
has been augmented by including workers aged 51 to 55 who have been de-
aged to age 50, and by pooling these observations from the years 1990 to
1994. In the de-aging process, the age of the spouse has been adapted ac-
cordingly, but all other variables are assumed to remain the same. The fol-
lowing reported monetary values are always present discounted values of
annual money ﬂows discounted back to age 50.
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6. In contrast to the earlier volume, persons retiring before age 60 are assumed to receive a
pension when reaching age 60. Average lifetime earnings are corrected to take into account
the number of years not worked between the retirement age and 60.8.7 Results
We will ﬁrst discuss a selection of the simulation results by means of a
number of graphs. After that, we consider the quantitative eﬀects on taxes
and beneﬁts by means of a number of tables. For the graphs we consider
only the OV models.
8.7.1 Results by Age
Figures 8.1 and 8.2 present the distributions of retirement ages under
four regimes for the models, with and without age dummies. We should
note that for each scenario, the hazard of leaving the labor force has been
set equal to 1 in the ﬁnal year of the simulation. This explains the spikes
that one observes in these ﬁnal years: observations with very low predicted
hazards during the simulation period, by construction have a very high
likelihood of exiting the labor force in the ﬁnal year. Clearly, the reforms
induce later labor force exits. The Three-Year Reform scenario tends to
draw out the distribution of labor force exits toward later ages. Compared
to the Three-Year Reform, the Common Reform has its greatest eﬀect in
the age range below 60, and around the early and normal retirement age,
as one would expect. The eﬀects of the Actuarial Reform are somewhat
more modest than those of the other two reforms. Eﬀects in the model with
age dummies tend to be more dramatic, due to the shift in dummies, than
in the model with quadratic age. Regarding ﬁgure 8.2, we should note that
for the Common Reform the density of retiring at ages 69 and 70 is not
zero; values of less than 1 percent have been rounded oﬀ to zero.
Figure 8.3 presents the distribution of social security beneﬁts by age of
retirement for the model with age dummies. As elsewhere, the social secu-
rity beneﬁts represent present discounted values (discounted back to age
50) of beneﬁts to be collected as of the date of retirement. Thus, for each
age in the ﬁgure, we calculate the SSW of each individual in the sample if
he or she were to retire at that age. We next weight that individual’s SSW
with the probability that the individual will retire at that age.
Figure 8.3 reveals an artifact of the simulations at the ﬁnal age for each
reform. As mentioned, under each scenario, the hazard of leaving the la-
bor force has been set equal to 1 in the ﬁnal year of the simulation. It turns
out that there are four observations for which the value of the explanatory
variables is such that the hazard of leaving the labor force predicted by the
model is essentially zero. In particular, the partner’s income turns out to be
very high. These four observations have a high SSW. Since by construction
their probability of exiting in the ﬁnal year is very high, these four obser-
vations get a very high weight in the ﬁnal year relative to the other obser-
vations. This then inﬂates the average SSW of people exiting in this year.
One should note that when looking at total eﬀects across all ages, these ob-
servations become less inﬂuential, so that the calculation of total eﬀects is
not unduly inﬂuenced.
338 Arie Kapteyn and Klaas de VosFig. 8.1 Distribution of retirement age (OV-S1 Model)
Fig. 8.2 Distribution of retirement age (OV-S3 Model)
Fig. 8.3 Social security beneﬁts by age of retirement (OV-S3 Model)Figure 8.3 illustrates that the reforms make it less attractive from a ben-
eﬁt point of view to retire early. Particularly at younger ages, beneﬁts are
substantially lower if one were to retire under the reforms than under the
current system.
Figure 8.4 shows the ﬂip side of ﬁgure 8.3 in that it presents the total
taxes paid by individuals by age of retirement. We observe that the Three-
Year Reform scenario shifts the taxes to later ages of exit.
Figures 8.5 and 8.6 show total eﬀects for the Three-Year Reform. We
show both the change in total beneﬁts if one moves from the base case to
the Three-Year Reform and the change in beneﬁts net of taxes. Both mod-
els produce fairly similar pictures. Gross beneﬁts fall before age 65, but af-
ter age 65 beneﬁts increase, for the simple reason that under the base case
scenario there are no people retiring after age 65, so that beneﬁts are zero
340 Arie Kapteyn and Klaas de Vos
Fig. 8.4 Taxes by age of retirement (OV-S3 Model)
Fig. 8.5 Total eﬀect by age of retirement (Three-Year Reform, OV-S1 Model)for these age categories. When looking at beneﬁts net of taxes, we see that
these fall across all ages, but particularly after age 65.
8.7.2 Fiscal Eﬀects
Figure 8.7 decomposes the total eﬀects (total beneﬁts net of taxes) into
a mechanical eﬀect and a behavioral eﬀect for all three reforms (Common
Reform [CR], Three-Year Reform [3YR], and Actuarial Reform [AA]) and
for the models with dummies (S3) and for the models with quadratic age
eﬀects (S1). The mechanical eﬀect assumes that there are no behavioral
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Fig. 8.6 Total eﬀect by age of retirement (Three-Year Reform, OV-S3 Model)
Fig. 8.7 Fiscal implications of reforms as a percentage of GDPresponses to the change in beneﬁts. The behavioral response is the diﬀer-
ence between the total eﬀect and the mechanical response. We observe that
the total eﬀects are biggest for the Common Reform scenarios (more than
3 percent of GDP) and smallest for the Actuarial Reform (less than 1 per-
cent of GDP). However, the behavioral eﬀects are biggest in the three-year
increment scenarios, particularly for the model with dummies (S3). As a
percentage of the total eﬀect, the behavioral eﬀects are biggest in the actu-
arial scenarios.
Table 8.3 provides more detail about the total eﬀects on taxes and bene-
ﬁts for various models and scenarios. We concentrate our discussion of the
table on the columns with percentages, as these are relatively easiest to in-
terpret. We note that the outcomes for beneﬁts are quite similar for the
peak value models and the option value models. For taxes, however, we ob-
serve that the peak value models indicate a slight reduction for the Com-
mon Reform, whereas the option value models indicate an increase; the
same is true for the Actuarial Reform. For the Three-Year Reform scenar-
ios, the peak and option value models produce outcomes that are more
similar. Qualitatively, all models show a reduction in beneﬁts as a result of
the reforms. The reduction is on the order of 30 percent for the Common
Reform, 15 percent for the Three-Year Reform, and 7 percent for the Ac-
tuarial Reform. In all cases, we observe that pension payments increase
substantially. This is, of course, not surprising, given that the reforms in-
duce people to work longer. Income taxes mostly increase, due to the pro-
gressivity of the tax system. The high earners, in particular, work longer
and hence pay more income taxes. Obviously, all these results depend cru-
cially on the assumption that tax rates as well as pension contribution rates
remain the same after the reforms.
Table 8.4 presents a decomposition of the ﬁscal eﬀects in a mechanical
component and a behavioral component. We see once again that for the
option value model the behavioral component is relatively more important
in the Three-Year Reform scenario than under the Common Reform. The
peak value model mimics this pattern for the model with age dummies, but
less so for the model with quadratic age. The eﬀects under the Actuarial
Reform are relatively more modest.
8.7.3 Distributional Eﬀects
For the option value model with quadratic age, table 8.5 presents ﬁscal
eﬀects by income quintile. Income here is total after-tax household earn-
ings at age 55. In percentage terms, the distributional eﬀects appear to be
minor. For instance, under the Common Reform the reduction in beneﬁts
net of taxes as a percentage of base beneﬁts is 48 percent for the lowest
quintile and 41 percent for the highest quintile. For the Three-Year Reform
scenario, the reduction is 16 percent for the lowest quintile and 27 percent
for the highest quintile. For the Actuarial Reform, the reduction ranges
from 9 percent to 16 percent. Table 8.6 presents the same analysis for the






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5model with age dummies. For the Common Reform and the Actuarial Re-
form, the eﬀects in table 8.6 are quite similar to the eﬀects reported in table
8.5. For the Three-Year Reform, the model with dummies yields bigger re-
ductions in beneﬁts than the model with quadratic age: the reduction varies
from 23 percent in the lowest quintile to 35 percent in the highest quintiles.
8.8 Conclusions
The Netherlands has a relatively generous system of pensions, social se-
curity beneﬁts, early retirement arrangements, and unemployment and
disability beneﬁts, which for most people provide incentives to retire from
the labor market well before the age of 65. In view of the increasing pro-
portion of elderly, the sustainability of this system is a problem, and sooner
or later, reforms will be unavoidable. In this paper, we compare the budget
eﬀects of three possible reforms, having modeled transitions into retire-
ment on the basis of microdata from The Netherlands Socio-Economic
Panel (SEP). Notably, these reforms have been devised for the purpose of
cross-country comparisons, and are not being proposed as desirable or po-
litically feasible reforms in The Netherlands. Furthermore, it should be
noted that the simulations have been performed on a particular cohort of
individuals, and results need not be the same for other cohorts. Bearing
these limitations in mind, we ﬁnd that the reforms would have considerable
(favorable) budget eﬀects. In general, the Common Reform has the
strongest eﬀects, a major part of which would be mechanical rather than
behavioral. The eﬀects of the second reform, which delay eligibility for
three years, depend largely on the retirement model chosen. The Actuarial
Reform has the smallest eﬀects.
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